As the
30th anniversary of the Falklands War approaches, Argentina has adopted an
increasingly assertive strategy of regional diplomacy and economic pressure to
draw attention to its long-running row with the United Kingdom over the islands.
The dispute over the desolate archipelago in the South Atlantic, inhabited by
about 3,000 people and 600,000 sheep, is no longer just a matter of national
pride over a vestige of empire. It is being cast by Buenos Aires as a
high-stakes scramble for substantial oil reserves that are believed to lie
beneath the waters surrounding the islands.
The
government of President Cristina Kirchner is seeking to pressure the UK
government into accepting negotiations over the sovereignty of the islands.
But unlike 1982, when invading troops were driven out by a British task force,
Argentina's current strategy is focused not on military deployments but on
diplomatic and economic initiatives. Buenos Aires hopes to harness the emerging
global clout of Latin American countries to strengthen its position. However,
the steps it has taken so far to embarrass the UK have had little impact.
Las
Malvinas, as the islands are called in Argentina, have long been a nationalist
cause for Argentine leaders seeking to bolster their domestic political
positions. This has been particularly true of the
Kirchner era, especially under Cristina, who was elected in 2007 to succeed her
husband Nestor (who later died). As the 30th anniversary approaches, she has
made a series of speeches and diplomatic manoeuvres in an effort to draw
attention to the issue. Calling Britain a 'crude colonial power in decline',
Kirchner said she would take Britain's 'militarisation' of the dispute to the
United Nations after the new destroyer HMS Dauntless
was deployed in 2012 as part of a regular South Atlantic naval patrol. Also
fanning the populist flames was the routine posting to the Falklands of Prince
William, a Royal Air Force search-and-rescue helicopter pilot who is second in
line to Queen Elizabeth's throne.
Oil
prospects
In 2010, British company Rockhopper announced
the discovery of the Sea Lion oil field 80 miles offshore in the North Falkland
Basin, and other companies showed renewed interest in exploring the
surrounding waters. Argentina responded by insisting that ships wishing to
transit its waters to the islands must obtain its authorisation. In 2011, new evidence reinforced the potential of the oil
fields. Rockhopper announced plans to start production in 2016, with a planned
output of up to 120,000 barrels per day. Rockhopper now projects that almost 450 million
barrels can be recovered from its Sea Lion find.
Further exploration projects set for this
year will focus on the areas to the south and east of the islands, enabled by
the arrival of the Leiv Eiriksson harsh environment rig
in January. The waters are deeper here and the maritime conditions more
difficult, meaning that exploring these reserves is more challenging and
expensive, but the prize is even larger. According to a report by Edison Investment Research, the
drill target for the Southern Basin alone is approximately 8bn barrels.
The
Loligo well, currently being explored by Falkland Oil and Gas Limited east of
the islands, is expected to contain 4.7bn barrels, which makes it one of the
largest drill targets in the world.
The Leiv Eiriksson rig will also drill
two wells for Borders & Southern Petroleum plc in the Southern Basin. The Darwin project, which the company believes holds as much as 760m barrels, is
already being drilled. Afterwards, the rig will move to Stebbing, which has a
target of 1.2bn barrels.
These explorations are already raising
tensions in the region. On 16 February, citing 'irrefutable satellite images',
Argentine newspaper Ámbito
Financiero said that the Leiv Eiriksson
rig along with three support ships had violated Argentine territorial waters by
entering its exclusive economic zone.
Until 2007, Argentina and the UK had an
agreement under which they pledged to cooperate in exploring the region's oil
resources. The Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Offshore Activities in the
Southwest Atlantic was signed on 27 September 1995. The government of Carlos
Menem signed the agreement in the belief that it was central to a peaceful solution
to the dispute, but Buenos Aires withdrew
in March 2007 as the 25th anniversary of the war approached, and as the UK
government moved to grant licences for oil exploration around the Falklands.
Diplomatic sparring
Diplomatic sparring
As the
economic prospects of the Falklands grew, Argentina launched a regional
diplomatic offensive to pressure the UK into sovereignty negotiations.
It sought to draw neighbouring countries into the dispute by arguing that the
British presence was aimed at extracting the South Atlantic's resources and
was, therefore, of concern to the entire region. At a December 2011 meeting of
the Mercosur
trade bloc (which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), Kirchner said:
'Malvinas is not an Argentine issue, it
is a global issue because they are taking energy and fishing resources out of
the Malvinas.'
Buenos
Aires gained support in the form of public statements during summits of heads
of state not only from Mercosur, but also from the 12-member Unasur (Union of
South American Nations), the 8-member Alba (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples
of Our America) and the 33 members of the newly formed Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States. The 34-nation Organisation of American States released a statement in February reiterating
its call for negotiations, and its secretary-general, Jose Miguel Insulza, criticised the UK for adopting a 'bellicose
tone' by sending the HMS
Dauntless.
Kirchner is not only drawing on a traditional
aversion to colonialism, but also on recent advances towards regional
integration. There has been a flurry of
summits and trade agreements, and a regional development bank, the Bank of the
South, has been established. These moves towards a regional community and
identity were spurred on to a large extent by former Brazilian President Luis
Inacio Lula da Silva, who forecast that 'South America, united, will move the
board game of power in the world.'
Though the measures taken so far by regional
organisations have little practical impact, they constitute the strongest
signals of support for Argentina in decades. Individual governments have also taken symbolic steps: in January 2011,
Brazil denied permission for the HMS Clyde patrol ship to dock at Rio de Janeiro
during a Falklands mission, the first time that Brazil had closed its ports to a
British ship. However, the Clyde was the offshore patrol ship with
specific responsibility for the Falklands, and Brazil has continued to accept
port visits from other Royal Navy vessels and is also purchasing three UK-built
patrol vessels. In December, Brazil and Uruguay agreed to ban from their ports
ships bearing the flag of the Falkland Islands, a decision that was followed by
Chile and Venezuela. However, this affects only 25 vessels, mostly fishing
boats, and the islanders plan to circumvent the ban by adopting the Red Ensign
flown by the UK merchant navy. Buenos Aires has also sought to persuade its
neighbours to end military-to-military links with the United Kingdom, but has
not succeeded in doing so.
On the domestic front, Argentina has taken
further steps to isolate the UK. In February, Industry Minister Debora Giorgi asked 20 companies dealing with the UK
to replace British imports with goods from 'nations that respect the
territorial integrity' of Argentina. Even if all companies complied, this would
cause little harm to the UK economy, since Argentina accounts for 0.3% of UK non-EU exports. Argentina also denied permission for two cruise ships flying British
flags to dock at Ushuaia, because they had previously been to Port Stanley in
the Falklands. In addition, islanders complain that
the Argentine government is putting pressure
on freight-container companies by threatening to deny them lucrative deals if
they continue to do business in the Falklands. According to Falkland islanders,
these measures amount to a de facto economic blockade.
Expressions of support for Argentina's cause by regional leaders such as Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (who suggested that the Bolivarian Alliance bloc should impose sanctions on the UK) were important in prompting Brazil – the region's biggest power and a traditional leader of South American integration – to back the diplomatic offensive, even if this risked cooling relations with the UK. Even Chile, which had previously resisted pressure to isolate the islands, joined practically all regional demonstrations of support for Argentina, which resulted in a phone call from UK Prime Minister David Cameron to Chilean President Sebastian Pinera. The head of the Chilean Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, Eugenio Tuma, said legislators would 'continue to support any action with the aim of persuading the United Kingdom to solve the conflict'.
Expressions of support for Argentina's cause by regional leaders such as Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (who suggested that the Bolivarian Alliance bloc should impose sanctions on the UK) were important in prompting Brazil – the region's biggest power and a traditional leader of South American integration – to back the diplomatic offensive, even if this risked cooling relations with the UK. Even Chile, which had previously resisted pressure to isolate the islands, joined practically all regional demonstrations of support for Argentina, which resulted in a phone call from UK Prime Minister David Cameron to Chilean President Sebastian Pinera. The head of the Chilean Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, Eugenio Tuma, said legislators would 'continue to support any action with the aim of persuading the United Kingdom to solve the conflict'.
While evoking its old colonialism argument,
deploying the geopolitics of oil and drawing on regional cooperation, Buenos
Aires is seeking to raise the political and economic cost of the UK's presence
in the area. Jorge Arguello,Argentina's ambassador to Washington, said in an interview:
'We have an objective which is to reduce the margin of British resistance to
comply with UN resolutions. We want them [the UK] to become alone and
isolated.' While this goal is far from being achieved, diplomatic difficulties
have been created for London just at a time when it has elevated relations with
the region to priority status. Foreign Secretary William Hague announced
in January the start of 'Britain's most ambitious effort to strengthen ties
with Latin America in 200 years.'
The UK
has begun what Hague calls a 'strategic dialogue' with Brazil and has set the
goal of doubling bilateral trade by 2015.
During a visit in January, Hague reiterated the UK's support for Brazil as a
prospective permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, the rapid
pace of regional integration means that Brazil and other regional powers are
under greater pressure to factor Argentine interests into their strategic
calculations.
Peru is
the latest country to give in to such pressures – on 19 March it cancelled a
scheduled visit by the Type 23 frigate HMS
Montrose, which
had been taking part in a regular patrol of the South Atlantic.
President Ollanta Humala had risked regional isolation if he accepted the
frigate, since his position was seen as contradicting recent agreements and
statements on the issue. He also declined an invitation to travel to the UK in
April, a visit bound to cause tension because of the anniversary of the 1982
war.
Military
assets
Argentina has been careful to avoid making threats to capture the islands by force, and another military confrontation remains unlikely. Though it has capable special-operations teams, the majority of its heavy military equipment still dates back to the 1970s and 1980s. The navy constructed ten new surface combatants, as well as two new submarines, in the mid-1980s, all based on German designs, but there have been few changes to its inventory since then. The air force and naval aviation combat inventories are in even worse shape, with the only major acquisition post-1982 being 36 modernised versions of the 1950s vintage A-4 Skyhawk
If any hostilities did take place, the
Argentine military would find the British military garrison – as well as civil
security capabilities – far stronger than they were in
1982. The Falklands is now home to an
army infantry company, a Rapier surface-to-air missile battery, four Typhoon fighter aircraft and a significantly
improved air-surveillance capability. At sea, in addition
to the resident patrol vessel HMS Clyde, the Royal Navy also
has the auxiliary tanker RFA Gold
Rover and the Type 45 destroyer HMS Dauntless
in the South Atlantic. As well as superior heavy equipment, the British armed
forces have surveillance assets, precision-guided weapons and substantial
recent experience of combat that would have a significant impact against
Argentina's outdated capabilities. This presence is intended to reassure the
Falkland islanders – who have clearly signalled their intent to remain part of
UK overseas territories – as well as to deter Argentina.
The UK,
however, is in the midst of a programme of defence spending cuts that have
deprived it of maritime patrol aircraft and, for the next decade, an aircraft
carrier. A number of former top military officers
have expressed
concern that, if Argentina were to capture the Falklands, Britain's weakened
armed forces would be unable to take them back. The response of British defence
officials has been to state that they do not envisage any scenario in which the
Falklands would have to be recaptured. Certainly, given the superior UK
capabilities and experience, it would now be a much greater challenge for
Argentina to invade successfully. In addition, an Argentine attack would
undermine the Kirchner government's attempt to portray the British as
twenty-first-century 'colonialist' aggressors, making an invasion not only
strategically unwise, but also politically counter-productive.
Brazil's
pivotal role
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