Apr 7th 2012 | from the print edition
NO MATTER how often China has emphasised the idea of a
peaceful rise, the pace and nature of its military modernisation inevitably
cause alarm. As America and the big European powers reduce their defence
spending, China looks likely to maintain the past decade’s increases of about
12% a year. Even though its defence budget is less than a quarter the size of
America’s today, China’s generals are ambitious. The country is on course to
become the world’s largest military spender in just 20 years or so (see article).
Much of its effort is aimed at deterring America from
intervening in a future crisis over Taiwan. China is investing heavily in
“asymmetric capabilities” designed to blunt America’s once-overwhelming
capacity to project power in the region. This “anti-access/area denial”
approach includes thousands of accurate land-based ballistic and cruise
missiles, modern jets with anti-ship missiles, a fleet of submarines (both
conventionally and nuclear-powered), long-range radars and surveillance satellites,
and cyber and space weapons intended to “blind” American forces. Most talked
about is a new ballistic missile said to be able to put a manoeuvrable warhead
onto the deck of an aircraft-carrier 2,700km (1,700 miles) out at sea.
China says all this is defensive, but its tactical
doctrines emphasise striking first if it must. Accordingly, China aims to be able to launch disabling attacks on
American bases in the western Pacific and push America’s carrier groups beyond
what it calls the “first island chain”, sealing off the Yellow Sea, South China
Sea and East China Sea inside an arc running from the Aleutians in the north to
Borneo in the south. Were Taiwan to attempt formal secession from the mainland,
China could launch a series of pre-emptive strikes to delay American
intervention and raise its cost prohibitively.
This has already had an effect on China’s neighbours, who
fear that it will draw them into its sphere of influence. Japan, South Korea,
India and even Australia are quietly spending more on defence, especially on
their navies. Barack Obama’s new “pivot” towards Asia includes a clear signal
that America will still guarantee its allies’ security. This week a
contingent of 200 US marines arrived in Darwin, while India took formal charge
of a nuclear submarine, leased from Russia.
En garde
The prospect of an Asian arms race is genuinely
frightening, but prudent concern about China’s build-up must not lapse into
hysteria. For the moment at least, China is far less formidable than hawks on
both sides claim. Its armed forces have had no real combat experience for
more than 30 years, whereas America’s have been fighting, and learning,
constantly. The capacity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for complex
joint operations in a hostile environment is untested. China’s formidable
missile and submarine forces would pose a threat to American carrier groups
near its coast, but not farther out to sea for some time at least. Blue-water
operations for China’s navy are limited to anti-piracy patrolling in the Indian
Ocean and the rescue of Chinese workers from war-torn Libya. Two or three
small aircraft-carriers may soon be deployed, but learning to use them will
take many years. Nobody knows if the “carrier-killer” missile can be made to
work.
As for China’s longer-term intentions, the West should
acknowledge that it is hardly unnatural for a rising power to aspire to have
armed forces that reflect its growing economic clout. China consistently
devotes a bit over 2% of GDP to defence—about the same as Britain and France
and half of what America spends. That share may fall if Chinese growth
slows or the government faces demands for more social spending. China might
well use force to stop Taiwan from formally seceding. Yet, apart from claims
over the virtually uninhabited Spratly and Paracel Islands, China is not
expansionist: it already has its empire. Its policy of non-interference in the
affairs of other states constrains what it can do itself.
The trouble is that China’s intentions are so
unpredictable. On the one hand China is increasingly willing to engage with
global institutions. Unlike the old Soviet Union, it has a stake in the liberal
world economic order, and no interest in exporting a competing ideology. The
Communist Party’s legitimacy depends on being able to honour its promise of
prosperity. A cold war with the West would undermine that. On the other hand,
China engages with the rest of the world on its own terms, suspicious of
institutions it believes are run to serve Western interests. And its
assertiveness, particularly in maritime territorial disputes, has grown with
its might. The dangers of military miscalculation are too high for comfort.
How to avoid accidents
It is in China’s interests to build confidence with its
neighbours, reduce mutual strategic distrust with America and demonstrate its
willingness to abide by global norms. A good start would be to submit
territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas to
international arbitration. Another step would be to strengthen promising
regional bodies such as the East Asian Summit and ASEAN Plus Three. Above all,
Chinese generals should talk far more with American ones. At present, despite
much Pentagon prompting, contacts between the two armed forces are limited,
tightly controlled by the PLA and ritually frozen by politicians whenever they
want to “punish” America—usually because of a tiff over Taiwan.
America’s response should mix military strength with
diplomatic subtlety. It must retain the ability to project force in Asia: to do
otherwise would feed Chinese hawks’ belief that America is a declining power
which can be shouldered aside. But it can do more to counter China’s paranoia.
To his credit, Mr Obama has sought to lower tensions over Taiwan and made it
clear that he does not want to contain China (far less encircle it as Chinese
nationalists fear). America must resist the temptation to make every security
issue a test of China’s good faith. There are bound to be disagreements between
the superpowers; and if China cannot pursue its own interests within the
liberal world order, it will become more awkward and potentially belligerent.
That is when things could get nasty.
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