The prime minister is set to announce another embarrassing U-turn

Apr 21st 2012 | from the print edition

http://www.economist.com/node/21553064

Britain’s aircraft-carriers

Reverse thrust

“WHEN the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” asked John Maynard Keynes. David Cameron might feel like quoting the great economist when he tells Parliament, as now seems almost certain, that the government is reversing its decision to buy the aircraft-carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C, rather than the F-35B variant originally ordered by Labour in the 1990s.

The switch to the F-35C, part of the budget-cutting Strategic Defence and Security Review published in October 2010, seemed like a good idea at the time. Mr Cameron pointed out that the plane not only boasted a greater range and more weapons, but would have 25% lower operating costs during its service life.

Unlike the F-35B, which can land vertically, the F-35C requires a catapult to launch it from the deck of a carrier and an arrester to catch it when it lands. What made it possible to opt for the more capable plane was the accompanying decision to fit one of the two new carriers under construction with “cats and traps”. Part of the reasoning was to allow joint operations with French and American carriers—something the defence secretary at the time, Liam Fox, set great store by. Although the first of the two carriers would operate only helicopters and would be mothballed as soon as the second entered service in 2018, the prospect of being able to mix and match with France’s aircraft-carrier was deemed crucial, enabling both countries to have a continuous, albeit shared, carrier presence at sea. When, in early 2011, America’s then-defence secretary, Robert Gates, placed the F-35B on “probation”, putting it at risk of cancellation because of its poor performance in testing, the decision seemed vindicated.

By then, however, estimates of the cost of the kit needed to allow the F-35C to take off and land had soared. Rather than the old-style steam-driven catapults that require bulky kettles, the Prince of Wales, as the new ship was to be called, was to get an untried electromagnetic system being developed for America’s new Ford-class carriers. The original cost estimate was about £400m ($640m), but is now said to have risen to £1.8 billion—money that would have to be found quickly by Philip Hammond, Dr Fox’s more cautious successor, from a tight defence budget if contracts were to be placed in time.

Almost as troubling were the technical snags the F-35C had started to hit, just as the B variant was coming good and being taken out of probation. Because of the F-35’s radar-cheating “stealth” design, the plane’s arrester hook was in the wrong place, raising the danger that it would fail to catch the wire on landing. A redesign would mean leaving Britain without carrier strike capability until 2025—a big embarrassment. Finally, it emerged that the F-35C would be too heavy to land on the deck of France’s Charles de Gaulle.

Switching back to the F-35B will in many ways be a relief to the air force and the navy who, after decades of experience with the Harrier jump jet (controversially taken out of service by the defence review) will be returning to an operational comfort zone. It also leaves open the option of operating two carriers rather than just one. But the downside remains: the B variant has half the range and a third of the payload of the F-35C. Joint operations with allies, deemed vital 18 months ago, are scuppered. Given the importance of these decisions—Britain will have to live with them for the next 40 years—the seesawing and lack of transparency is disturbing.