Showing posts with label China and Oil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China and Oil. Show all posts

Sunday, 26 February 2012

China and Oil


Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Still a Pipedream: A Pakistan-to-China rail corridor is not a substitute for maritime transport ,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 13 (22 December 2010).
China SignPost™ 洞察中国–“Clear, high-impact China analysis.”©
The recent flurry of trade deals and MOUs (worth US$35 billion) signed during Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent visit to Pakistan have brought the possibility of a more robust Pakistan-to-China transport corridor back into the spotlight. The trade deals stand to drive increased economic activity by Chinese companies in Pakistan in coming years.

However, our assessment is that while the trade and investment agreements may help cement an “all weather” alliance between Beijing and Islamabad, they do not mean that an all weather transport corridor becomes viable. An expanded road and rail network linking Pakistan to China faces three key challenges. The bottom line is that maritime shipping routes will remain a cheaper, simpler, and more secure option for moving crude oil and other goods into China.

1) Security. The proposed transport corridor would go through areas that are subject to flooding and insurgent activity, as well as avalanches, landslides, and seismic activity in the Karakoram Range. If any of these disruptive events materializes, rail and road traffic cannot re-route around the trouble point the way that ships at sea can.

2) Capacity. A modern one-track rail line in the United States can currently handle around 16 trains per day, according to Cambridge Systematics. A Pakistan-to China rail corridor would likely be built with one track each way, but with reduced throughput of around 12 trains per day. U.S. freight trains carried an average of 2,800 tonnes of cargo in 2004, according to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Trains transiting the Khunjerab Pass would likely carry smaller loads, perhaps 2,000 tonnes, due to the large vertical gradient. With these train frequency and load parameters, the corridor would be able to handle 8.75 million tonnes of cargo per year, or approximately 175,000 barrels of oil per day if all the trains carried oil.
To move the volumes that would be necessary to make this route able to handle enough cargo to reduce sea transport reliance measurably, there would need to be a rail setup with 3 or 4 lines. Furthermore, bringing that much cargo into Western China’s rail network and then having to move it into industrial areas in the central and eastern regions would likely necessitate additional capacity expansions of the national rail system. These investments would likely be cost-prohibitive.

3) High construction and transport costs. The tariffs needed to pay off the finance costs of the route and move freight over a 15,000 foot vertical relief would likely make the cost highly uncompetitive with sea routes. The roughly 2,000 km-long Qingzang railway to Lhasa, Tibet cost roughly US$4 billion to build (US$1.85 million per km). The cost per km to build a rail line connecting Islamabad and Kashgar could be several times more expensive to build given the tough geologic and political circumstances along the route.
In terms of transport costs, we estimate that moving a barrel of oil by sea to Shanghai at a ship rate of US$75,000 per day at 23 km per hour with a 2 million barrel cargo costs around US$0.90 per barrel, while moving it by barge upriver to the rapidly-growing inland demand center of Chongqing would cost an additional US$1.23 per barrel, for a total transport cost of US$2.22 per barrel (Exhibit 1).
In contrast, moving oil from Ras al-Tanura to Gwadar and then by rail into the heartland of China would likely cost closer to US$8.00 to US$12.40 per barrel, making that route economically uncompetitive, as well as limited in capacity. The disparity would be slightly greater for major cities on China’s east coast.
Exhibit 1:  Estimated costs of moving oil to Chongqing, China from the Persian Gulf by sea and via Pakistan
U.S. Dollars per barrel





Source:  BNSF Railway, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, NBS, ND Petroleum Council, China SignPost™

In short, there are compelling reasons why sea transport has been dominant for so long. To even build a Pakistan-to-China rail corridor would require massive upfront investments, would be economically uncompetitive relative to sea routes, and due to the many physical and political risks along the route, commercial shippers would likely be highly reluctant to use it.

http://www.chinasignpost.com/2010/12/still-a-pipedream-a-pakistan-to-china-rail-corridor-is-not-a-substitute-for-maritime-transport/

China and Oil

Oversea Trumps Overland:

China’s Oil Supply Future is Maritime

In the latest of sporadic attacks on infrastructure associated with Burma’s junta, bombs recently exploded at a controversial hydropower project being built jointly with Beijing’s state-owned China Power Investment Corporation. This underscores the challenges China faces in helping to construct an oil pipeline through restive Burmese minority regions. A senior scholar informs us that China has been particularly careful in addressing issues surrounding Burma’s Wa minority because of the politically and physically vulnerable pipeline.

So why allow such sensitive issues to condition Beijing’s foreign policy? A major factor: oil. Chinese demand, growing rapidly, has reached 8.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) and the country likely became a net gasoline importer by the end of 2009. While still a very significant oil producer, China is now the world’s second-largest oil user. It imports more than half of its crude oil, with imports of 4.9 million bpd in March 2010. Seaborne imports constitute more than 80 percent of this total. At present, therefore, 40 percent of China’s oil comes by sea.

China’s oil security concerns will determine to what extent China will seek to transform itself from a continental to a continental-maritime power. China’s dynamic maritime development already demonstrates significant movement in the maritime direction.

Chinese security analysts and policy makers worry about their nation’s “excessive” reliance on seaborne oil shipments. Many believe that by investing in pipelines from neighboring oil producers like Russia and Kazakhstan and building additional lines to “bypass” the Malacca Strait, China can protect its oil imports from possible interdiction during a conflict. A robust internal debate is being waged within China at multiple levels regarding how to ensure access to oil supplies. At stake is the extent to which China should cooperate with international economic institutions versus seeking unilateral military solutions; should develop as a maritime versus continental power; and should focus on defending against state, as opposed to non-state, actors.

Despite this diversity of opinion, a wide variety of influential Chinese experts, including scholars, policy analysts, and members of the military, believe that the United States can sever China’s seaborne energy supplies at will and in a crisis might well choose to do so.

It is widely claimed, for instance, that “whoever controls the Strait of Malacca effectively grips China’s strategic energy passage, and can threaten China’s energy security at any time.”

Such views are widely cited to justify the development of a nationally-flagged tanker fleet, as well as pipeline construction, which is proceeding rapidly. China already has seventy thousand kilometers of oil and gas pipelines and aims to reach ninety thousand km during the Twelfth Five- Year Plan (2011–15).

Yet China’s overland oil supply plans appear largely to be driven by a combination of incomplete assessment of security issues and lobbying by sectoral and local commercial and political interests of an overtaxed national energy policy-making apparatus.

At present, the Kazakhstan–China pipeline is operational, a Russia–China line could become operational by late 2010 (and is likely to be in commercial operation by 2011), the Burma–China pipeline is now under construction, and a China–Pakistan pipeline remains entirely aspirational.

Some projects—such as the line from Russia that is now under construction and an existing line from Kazakhstan—are indeed economically viable overland conduits that will bring at least limited diversity to China’s oil supplies. Others, however, like the Burma pipeline and especially the proposed line via Pakistan, make much less economic and security sense.

In the end, pipelines are not likely to increase Chinese oil import security in quantitative terms, because the additional volumes they bring in will be overwhelmed by China’s demand growth; the country’s net reliance on seaborne oil imports will grow over time, pipelines notwithstanding. Chinese decision makers must face the fact that, barring discovery of an economically viable large-scale substitute for crude oil, their nation’s dependence on seaborne imports will likely only increase. Cooperative steps to safeguard free markets and the seaborne flow of energy imports will best support Chinese access to reliable, affordable oil supplies in the future.

The U.S. and China, now the world’s two largest oil consumers, share an interest in maintaining secure, stable, and affordable oil supplies.
They should consider establishing a joint petroleum inventory reporting system. Their navies should address maritime crises in areas far from sensitive areas surrounding China and the U.S. (e.g. preventing Somali pirates from hijacking tankers in the Gulf of Aden). While it is indeed developing anti-access capabilities that could threaten the presence of the U.S. military and those of its allies and friends in the Western Pacific, China is also commissioning and deploying surface platforms that enable it to make positive contributions to the security of the global maritime commons.

Since 26 December 2008, China’s navy has dispatched twelve ships in five counter-piracy task forces to the Gulf of Aden. As of 20 March 2010, these forces had escorted 1,768 ships in 179 convoys. Sixteen Chinese naval operations have rescued 10 Chinese and 13 foreign-flagged vessels from pursuit by pirates. As of 25 December 2009, 3,300 Chinese naval personnel had participated and 405 foreign vessels had been escorted. China’s purpose-built hospital ship, the Type 920 Daishandao/Peace Ark (岱山岛号, AHH 866), is now operational, having completed an initial mission in the South China Sea. As the first of what will reportedly be annual international deployments, Peace Ark is slated to conduct humanitarian operations in the Middle East and Africa in 2010.

Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, recently testified before Congress that he “expect[ed]” China’s former Ukrainian Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Varyag “to become operational around 2012 and likely be used to develop basic carrier skills.” The Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that “the PRC will likely have an operational, domestically produced carrier sometime after 2015.” Scott Bray, Senior Intelligence Officer-China, ONI, assesses that “China likely intends to use aircraft carriers to bring the air component of maritime power to the South China Sea and other regional areas to protect Chinese sea lanes, shipping, and enforcing maritime claims. Additionally, an aircraft carrier would likely be used in regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.” As they pursue shared interests even amid areas of strong disagreement, Washington and Beijing should also consider establishing a joint threat reporting database for vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). Washington should also encourage Beijing to join the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA); as well as the International Energy Agency (IEA), to facilitate closer SPR management cooperation.

http://www.chinasignpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/China-Signpost_1__Chinas-Oil-Supply-Future-is-Maritime_2010-05-26.pdf