Showing posts with label Israel Defence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israel Defence. Show all posts

Monday, 4 June 2012

‘Israel fitting N-arms on subs’


Monday, June 04, 2012




BERLIN: Israel is arming submarines supplied and largely financed by Germany with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, influential German news weekly Der Spiegel reports in its issue to be published on Monday.


The magazine said in a cover story likely to touch off a debate in Germany that Berlin had until now denied any knowledge that German submarines were being used as part of an Israeli atomic arsenal.


Israel is the Middle East’s sole if undeclared nuclear-armed power. However, former high-ranking officials of the German defence ministry told the magazine that the government always assumed that Israel was putting nuclear warheads on the Dolphin-class vessels.


The article, based on a months-long probe, cited files from the foreign ministry in Berlin indicating that the West German state was aware of the practice as early as 1961.


Germany has already supplied Israel with three of the submarines in question, footing most of the bill, and another three are to be delivered by 2017 under a recently signed contract.



Meanwhile Israel is weighing whether to order three more, according to the report.


“The Germans can be proud to have ensured the existence of the state of Israel for several years to come,” Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak was quoted by Der Spiegel as saying.


The report said that Germany hoped to see Israeli concessions on settlements and approval for the completion of a sewage treatment plant in the Gaza Strip in exchange for the assistance.

Wednesday, 30 May 2012

Use of Flame virus to deter Iran ‘reasonable’: Israel

By on Wednesday, May 30th, 2012 



A top Israeli minister said on Tuesday the use of cyber weapons, such as the newly uncovered Flame virus, to counter Iran’s nuclear plans would be “reasonable,” hinting at Israel’s possible involvement.

“For anyone who sees the Iranian threat as significant, it is reasonable that he would take different steps, including these, in order to hobble it,” Vice Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon told army radio, just hours after the virus was discovered by Russia’s Kaspersky Lab.

“Israel is blessed with being a country which is technologically rich, and these tools open up all sorts of possibilities for us,” said Yaalon, who is also Israel’s strategic affairs minister.

Kaspersky Lab, one of the world’s biggest producers of anti-virus software, said its experts discovered the virus — known as Flame — during an investigation prompted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

Iran appears to have been the main target of the attack, and the announcement comes just a month after the Islamic republic said it halted the spread of a data-deleting virus targeting computer servers in its oil sector.

It said the virus was “about 20 times larger than Stuxnet,” the worm which was discovered in June 2010 and used against the Iranian nuclear programme, with Israel widely suspected of involvement.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while not mentioning Flame, spoke on Tuesday of Israel’s cyber prowess.

“In the cyber arena, the size of a country is not that important but there is great significance in its scientific ability and in that Israel is blessed,” he told an international security conference at Tel Aviv University.

“We are investing huge capital in that; human capital and financial capital, and I expect that investment to grow in the coming years. I have set the target of Israel being among the five leading world powers in the cyber field.”

A Kaspersky statement said Flame is “actively being used as a cyber weapon attacking entities in several countries,” describing its purpose as “cyber espionage.”

“The complexity and functionality of the newly discovered malicious programme exceed those of all other cyber menaces known to date,” it added.

“It’s like nothing else we’ve seen before,” said Ilan Froimovitch, chief technical officer of Kaspersky’s Israeli representative, Power Communication.

“It’s like they took the best from every malicious code there is and combined it into one code.”

He said that the originator of the programme was most probably a state or a coalition of states.

“It is not likely that an individual or even a private company would invest so much effort and so much time and money,” he said. “This must be the work of a government or a few of them.

“I don’t think that this is a 16-year-old nerd that is trying to sit and write some code and do some damage,” he added. “It is not designed to do damage, it is designed to gather intelligence, it is designed to be unknown.”

Froimovitch declined to say if he thought Israel was capable of such a project.

“We have great knowledge in Israel and we like to think that we are the smartest in the world, but evidence shows that there are probably a few more countries in the West that can work like that.”

Alexander Gostev, Kaspersky’s chief security expert, said Iran was the country by far the worst affected by Flame, followed by Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Sudan, Syria and Lebanon.

“The geography of the targets and also the complexity of the threat leaves no doubt about it being a nation state that sponsored the research that went into it,” he said in an analysis article.

He said the aim of the virus was clearly to “collect information” on the operations of states in the Middle East such as Iran, Lebanon and Syria.

According to Western media reports, Flame has been used to attack the Iranian oil ministry and Iran’s main oil export terminal.

Kaspersky said Flame had been “in the wild” for more than two years, since March 2010.

Sunday, 6 May 2012

Israel To Receive Fourth Dolphin Sub

May. 2, 2012 - 05:47PM   |  




TEL AVIV — Vice Adm. Ram Rothberg, commander of the Israel Navy, and senior Defense Ministry representatives were in Germany on May 2, most likely to prepare for receipt of Israel’s fourth nuclear-capable Dolphin submarine.
Israel’s Walla website reported that Rothberg and a delegation led by retired Maj. Gen. Udi Shani, director-general of Israel’s MoD, were meeting with German counterparts in Kiel, home of the shipbuilding division of Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems (TKMS).
The German shipyard has been under contract with the government of Israel since 2005 for the fourth and fifth submarines of the Israeli Navy’s planned six-submarine fleet. Under that 2005 deal, Germany agreed to underwrite one third of construction costs.
A contract for a sixth submarine was recently signed, with Berlin agreeing to subsidize $180 million, about a third of hull construction costs.
When asked about the Israeli online report, a former Navy officer said Israel’s official receipt of the submarine does not mean the vessels will immediately set sail for Navy headquarters in Haifa Bay. According to the retired officer, the submarine could remain in Germany for several more months for systems integration and sea trials.
In an interview earlier this year, a senior Navy commander said the service hoped to declare its fourth Dolphin submarine operational in early 2013, with the fifth German-built submarine slated for operational deployment in 2014.

Sunday, 29 April 2012

Israel’s Growing Commando Force Eyes V-22s

Apr. 28, 2012 - 01:49PM |      By BARBARA OPALL-ROME


TEL AVIV — Israeli military leaders plan to greatly expand the nation’s elite commando force to accommodate intensifying demand for stealthy, surgical, strategic missions far from Israel’s borders.

In interviews here, officers and experts said Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff, is mulling several options for augmenting the special operations forces under his command, including creation of an airborne insertion and extraction unit built upon a squadron of U.S. V-22 Ospreys.

The prospective new unit or, alternatively, a strengthened Shaldag (Kingfisher) airborne commando unit, would ultimately be integrated into the IDF’s planned Depth Corps, a joint special operations command expected to become operational this year.

The IDF announced plans to establish Depth Corps last December, characterizing its “primary task” as “extending joint IDF operations into the strategic depth.” Elite units to be consolidated under the new command include Shaldag, Sayeret Matkal (General Staff Reconnaissance) and Flotilla 13.

The joint special operations command and the prospective new unit, which would not become operational until later in the decade, come in response to the drastic increase in the number of special missions conducted by the IDF in recent years.

In a rare interview published April 25 in Yediot Ahronot, Israel’s largest daily newspaper, Gantz acknowledged a “tens of percent” increase in special missions operational tempo as compared to previous years.

“You almost won’t find a point in time that nothing is happening somewhere around the world. … It’s not my invention, and I am not taking credit. I am simply accelerating all those special operations,” Gantz said.

The article noted that under Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, the former IDF chief of staff who hailed from the Golani infantry, the Israeli military was postured for two distinct conditions: war and planning for war. Under Gantz, a paratrooper and former Shaldag commander, the IDF has added a third condition: preparing the infrastructure for war through special operations in enemy territory on a routine basis.

Amir Bohbot, a military analyst here, estimated that the IDF has more than doubled the number of special operations conducted since the years prior to the 2006 Lebanon War. In a late March online report for Israel’s Walla website, Bohbot said current and former special forces officers have warned that the routine pace of special operations forces has begun to stress already-overtaxed commando units.

According to Bohbot, IDF’s shadow army targets two axes used by terrorism groups for smuggling weaponry and other contraband, primarily from Iran, into Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Israel’s military censor strictly forbids reference to areas from which Israel operates, but smuggling routes are well-documented.

The first known route is a seaborne path that originates in the Gulf of Oman and extends around the Arabian Peninsula into the Red Sea, after which illicit cargo is offloaded for overland smuggling through Sinai or — less frequently — transferred to ships passing through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean.

The second is a direct air corridor between Iran and Syria, after which cargo is delivered by ground transport or ship to Lebanese ports.

In an interview earlier this year, a senior Navy officer attested to the accelerated rate of special missions conducted by Israel’s sea service.

“The war between wars is a huge part of what we do, and I’m not willing to go into details. Suffice it to say we’re heavily involved in missions in all kinds of places … and when we do these missions, first and foremost we need to know how to bring our people back safely.”

Sources here said detailed organizational plans, budgetary requirements and the operational concept driving the new joint Depth Corps will be submitted to Gantz in June. By August, the IDF General Staff hopes to conclude its multiyear budget through 2017, with initial funding for the V-22 squadron and new naval capabilities likely to be included.
Over the past year, the Israel Air Force (IAF) has intensified its contacts with the U.S. Marine Corps and other U.S. counterparts on the V-22, and has sent pilots to fly the tilt-rotor aircraft. Earlier this month, IAF Commander Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan made his own flight in the V-22 from Hurlburt Field, Fla., home of U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command.

In an interview last year, Nehushtan said the IAF was developing “a deep acquaintance” with what he called a unique platform.

“It’s compelling because it combines abilities of an assault transport and an assault helicopter for flexible, rapid deployment of forces,” Nehushtan told Defense News. “But it’s new territory, and its capabilities are not yet widely understood throughout the IDF.”

At the time, Nehushtan said the IAF included ground force officers on its V-22-related visits “for educational purposes in the hope of pushing it forward in the upcoming multiyear plan.”

A U.S. source said the U.S. Navy and the Pentagon’s International Security Affairs bureau are encouraging Israel and other allies with operational requirements for the V-22, in large part to compensate for the 24 aircraft cut from the U.S. multiyear procurement plan.

“No doubt, the V-22 will be a game-changer for Israel. ... It also will help contain unit costs that will grow since they cut us down from 122 to 98,” the source said of aviation procurement cuts in the Pentagon’s five-year-plan.

He added, “We’re starting to see serious interest there that could translate into a [letter of request] by early next year.”

The V-22 is built by Chicago-based Boeing and Textron’s
Bell Helicopter unit.

Friday, 20 April 2012

Rafael acquires 40% stake in Brazil's Gespi Aeronautics


Israel's Rafael has expanded into Brazil with the acquisition of a 40 per cent stake in Gespi Aeronautics. State-owned Rafael said the purchase - its first in Brazil - would improve local capabilities and boost the government's efforts to increase defence exports. Gespi's customers include all three of Brazil's armed services
[first posted to
http://jdin.janes.com - 12 April 2012]

Tuesday, 10 April 2012

Israel is now entering its third strategic environment.

By George Friedman

The constant threat of state-on-state war defined the first, which lasted from the founding of the Jewish state until its peace treaty with Egypt.

A secure periphery defined the second, which lasted until recently and focused on the Palestinian issue, Lebanon and the rise of radical Sunni Islamists.

The rise of Iran as a regional power and the need to build international coalitions to contain it define the third.

Israel's fundamental strategic problem is that its national security interests outstrip its national resources, whether industrial, geographic, demographic or economic.

During the first phase, it was highly dependent on outside powers -- first the Soviet Union, then France and finally the United States -- in whose interest it was to provide material support to Israel. In the second phase, the threat lessened, leaving Israel relatively free to define its major issues, such as containing the Palestinians and attempting to pacify Lebanon. Its dependence on outside powers decreased, meaning it could disregard those powers from time to time. In the third phase, Israel's dependence on outside powers, particularly the United States, began increasing. With this increase, Israel's freedom for maneuver began declining.

Containing the Palestinians by Managing its Neighbors

The Palestinian issue, of course, has existed since Israel's founding. By itself, this issue does not pose an existential threat to Israel, since the Palestinians cannot threaten the Israeli state's survival. The Palestinians have had the ability to impose a significant cost on the occupation of the West Bank and the containing of the Gaza Strip, however. They have forced the Israelis to control significant hostile populations with costly, ongoing operations and to pay political costs to countries Israel needs to manage its periphery and global interests. The split between Hamas and Fatah reduced the overall threat but raised the political costs. This became apparent during the winter of 2008-2009 during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza when Hamas, for its own reasons, chose to foment conflict with Israel. Israel's response to Hamas' actions cost the Jewish state support in Europe, Turkey and other places.

Ideological or religious considerations aside, the occupation of the territories makes strategic sense in that if Israel withdraws, Hamas might become militarized to the point of threatening Israel with direct attack or artillery and rocket fire. Israel thus sees itself forced into an occupation that carries significant political costs in order to deal with a theoretical military threat. The threat is presently just theoretical, however, because of Israel's management of its strategic relations with its neighboring nation-states.

Israel has based its management of its regional problem less on creating a balance of power in the region than on taking advantage of tensions among its neighbors to prevent them from creating a united military front against Israel. From 1948 until the 1970s, Lebanon refrained from engaging Israel. Meanwhile, Jordan's Hashemite regime had deep-seated tensions with the Palestinians, with Syria and with Nasserite Egypt. In spite of Israeli-Jordanian conflict in 1967, Jordan saw Israel as a guarantor of its national security. Following the 1973 war, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel that created a buffer zone in the Sinai Peninsula.

By then, Lebanon had begun to shift its position, less because of any formal government policy and more because of the disintegration of the Lebanese state and the emergence of a Palestine Liberation Organization presence in southern Lebanon. Currently, with Syria in chaos, Jordan dependent on Israel and Egypt still maintaining the treaty with Israel despite recent Islamist political gains, only Lebanon poses a threat, and that threat is minor.

The Palestinians therefore lack the political or military support to challenge Israel. This in turn has meant that other countries' alienation over Israeli policy toward the Palestinians has carried little risk. European countries opposed to Israeli policy are unlikely to take significant action. Because political opposition cannot translate into meaningful action, Israel can afford a higher level of aggressiveness toward the Palestinians.

Thus, Israel's strongest interest is in maintaining divisions among its neighbors and maintaining their disinterest in engaging Israel. In different ways, unrest in Egypt and Syria and Iran's regional emergence pose a serious challenge to this strategy.

Egypt

Egypt is the ultimate threat to Israel. It has a huge population and, as it demonstrated in 1973, it is capable of mounting complex military operations.

But to do what it did in 1973, Egypt needed an outside power with an interest in supplying Egypt with massive weaponry and other support. In 1973, that power was the Soviet Union, but the Egyptians reversed their alliance position to the U.S. camp following that war. Once their primary source of weaponry became the United States, using that weaponry depended heavily on U.S. supplies of spare parts and contractors.

At this point, no foreign power would be capable of, or interested in, supporting the Egyptian military should Cairo experience regime change and a break with the United States. And a breach of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty alone would not generate a threat to Israel. The United States would act as a brake on Egyptian military capabilities, and no new source would step in. Even if a new source did emerge, it would take a generation for the Egyptians to become militarily effective using new weapon systems. In the long run, however, Egypt will remain Israel's problem.

Syria

The near-term question is Syria's future. Israel had maintained a complex and not always transparent relationship with the Syrian government. In spite of formal hostilities, the two shared common interests in Lebanon. Israel did not want to manage Lebanon after Israeli failures in the 1980s, but it still wanted Lebanon -- and particularly Hezbollah -- managed. Syria wanted to control Lebanon for political and economic reasons and did not want Israel interfering there. An implicit accommodation was thus possible, one that didn't begin to unravel until the United States forced Syria out of Lebanon, freeing Hezbollah from Syrian controls and setting the stage for the 2006 war.

Israel continued to view the Alawite regime in Syria as preferable to a radical Sunni regime. In the context of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the threat to Israel came from radical Sunni Islamists; Israel's interests lay with whoever opposed them. Today, with the United States out of Iraq and Iran a dominant influence there, the Israelis face a more complex choice. If the regime of President Bashar al Assad survives (with or without al Assad himself), Iran -- which is supplying weapons and advisers to Syria -- will wield much greater influence in Syria. In effect, this would create an Iranian sphere of influence running from western Afghanistan to Iraq, Syria and into Lebanon via Hezbollah. It would create a regional power. And an Iranian regional power would pose severe dangers to Israel.

Accordingly, Israel has shifted its thinking from supporting the al Assad regime to wanting it to depart so that a Sunni government hostile to Iran but not dominated by radical Islamists could emerge. Here we reach the limits of Israeli power, because what happens in Syria is beyond Israel's control. Those who might influence the course of events in Syria apart from Iran include Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Both are being extremely cautious in their actions, however, and neither government is excessively sensitive to U.S. needs. Israel's main ally, the United States, has little influence in Syria, particularly given Russian and, to some extent, Chinese opposition to American efforts to shape Syria's future.
Even more than Egypt, Syria is a present threat to Israel, not by itself but because it could bring a more distant power -- Iran -- to bear. As important, Syria could threaten the stability of the region by reshaping the politics of Lebanon or destabilizing Jordan. The only positive dimension for Israel is that Iran's military probably will not be able to deploy significant forces far from its borders for many years. Iran simply lacks the logistical or command capabilities for such an operation. But developing them is just a matter of time. Israel could, of course, launch a war in Syria. But the challenge of occupying Syria would dwarf the challenge Israel faces with the Palestinians. On the other side of the equation, an Iranian presence in Syria could reshape the West Bank in spite of Shiite-Sunni tensions.
The United States and the Europeans, with Libya as a model, theoretically could step into managing Syria. But Libya was a seven-month war in a much less populous country. It is unlikely they would attempt this in Syria, and if they did, it would not be because Israel needed them to do so. And this points to Israel's core strategic weakness. In dealing with Syria and the emergent Iranian influence there, Israel is incapable of managing the situation by itself. It must have outside powers intervening on its behalf. And that intervention poses military and political challenges that Israel's patron, the United States, doesn't want to undertake.
It is important to understand that Israel, after a long period in which it was able to manage its national security issues, is now re-entering the phase where it cannot do so without outside support. This is where its policy on the Palestinians begins to hurt, particularly in Europe, where intervention on behalf of Israeli interests would conflict with domestic European political forces. In the United States, where the Israeli-Palestinian problem has less impact, the appetite to intervene in yet another Muslim country is simply not there, particularly without European allies.

Iran

This is all compounded by the question of Iranian nuclear weapons. In our view, as we have said, the Iranians are far closer to a controlled underground test than to a deliverable weapon. Israel's problem is that Iran appears on the verge of a strategic realignment in the region. The sense that Iran is an emerging nuclear power both enhances Iran's position and decreases anyone's appetite to do anything about it. Israel is practicing psychological warfare against Iran, but it still faces a serious problem: The more Iran consolidates its position in the Middle East and the closer it is to a weapon the more other countries outside the region will have to accommodate themselves to Iran. And this leaves Israel vulnerable.
Israel cannot do much about Syria, but a successful attack on Iranian nuclear facilities could undermine Iranian credibility at a time when Israel badly needs to do just that. Here again, Israel faces its strategic problem. It might be able to carry out an effective strike against Iran, particularly if, as has been speculated, a country such as Azerbaijan provides facilities like airfields. However, even with such assistance, Israel's air force is relatively small, meaning there is no certainty of success. Nor could Israel strike without American knowledge and approval. The Americans will know about an Israeli strike by technical intelligence. Hiding such a strike from either the Americans or Russians would be difficult, compounding the danger to Israel.
More important, Israel cannot strike Iran without U.S. permission because Israel cannot guarantee that the Iranians would not mine the Strait of Hormuz

Only the United States could hope to stop the Iranians from doing so, and the United States would need to initiate the conflict by taking out the Iranian mine-laying capability before the first Israeli strike. Given its dependence on the United States for managing its national security, the decision to attack would have to be taken jointly. An uncoordinated attack by Israel would be possible only if Israel were willing to be the cause of global economic chaos.
Israel's strategic problem is that it must align its strategy with the United States and with anyone the United States regards as essential to its national security, such as the Saudis. But the United States has interests beyond Israel, so Israel is constantly entangled with its patron's multiplicity of interests. This limits its range of action as severely as its air force's constraints do.

Since its peace treaty with Egypt, Israeli dependence on outsiders was limited. Israel could act on issues like settlements, for example, regardless of American views. That period is coming to an end, and with it the period in which Israel could afford to deviate from its patron. People frequently discuss any U.S.-Israeli rift in terms of personal relations between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but this is mistaken. It is uncertainty in Egypt and Syria and the emergence of Iran that have created a new strategic reality for Israel.

Friday, 6 April 2012

Things to Think About Before Israel Attacks Iran

http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/things-to-think-about-before-israel-attacks-iran/

For several years, Israel has publicly and explicitly stated that if Iran attempts to develop a nuclear weapon, Israel will attack to prevent the program from succeeding or to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability. This is the most important security threat of the new century. Iran getting the bomb would be bad, but Israel going to war against Iran would be almost as bad.

Not surprisingly, there has been a lot of discussion in the media about the issue. Is Iran really building a nuclear weapon? When will it be ready? Could Israel really destroy or significantly delay the Iranian nuclear weapons program? What would be the consequences? These are worthwhile questions, but somewhere around question three everyone gets tangled up in the details.

Few news anchors or talk show hosts have the military or scientific understanding to ask decent questions. Worse still are the many pundits who have been interviewed, and having been asked a useless question, provided a useless answer. As a result, countless photons have been sacrificed to no good end.

I am desperately interested in this issue, as many others are, and have suffered countless disappointments as anchors rehash old questions or misinterpret a talking head’s answer. And may the ghost of Sun Tzu haunt those hired guns that claim to have the inside story. Save us from their misinformation. Or outright fabrications.

The points listed below are routinely missed in any discussion of a potential attack by Israel on Iran. While it is impossible to find any fact that 100 percent of the people will agree with (see www.flatearth.com), these approach 95 percent or better:

1) The Iranian bomb program isn’t about just Natanz.

In fact, Natanz is almost redundant. There are two paths to developing a nuke: Enrichment to get Uranium-235, or extraction of Plutonium-239 from used reactor fuel. The Iranians are pursuing both routes.

There are seven publicly known installations at four locations that are essential to the Iranian nuclear weapons program: The heavy water reactor and heavy water plant at Arak, the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom (Fordow), and the fuel manufacturing plant, uranium conversion facility, and zirconium processing plant at Esfahan. They are all in the Israelis’ target folders.

Bushehr is not on the list. This is the Iranian’s “Potemkin” reactor. “See? Peaceful neutrons!” It is extremely difficult to extract weapons-grade plutonium from a light water reactor like Bushehr, and the Russians have been scrupulous about controlling the fuel. Bombing Bushehr would be a waste.
Of the seven installations, only the two centrifuge facilities are hardened against air attack. The other five, and most of Natanz for that matter, are housed in ordinary industrial structures.

Question for news anchors to use: Why is Natanz so heavily defended and protected, while equally important installations are virtually naked?

2) The Israelis can’t do it all in one day, or one raid.

This isn’t Osiraq in 1981, or Syria in 2007. There are too many targets in each facility, and they’re too spread out. Four locations would suggest at least four raids, with re-strikes a possibility. Esfahan by itself demands two squadrons of strikers, in addition to the support aircraft. That’s including the larger size of Israeli squadrons (24 planes instead of the standard 12).

Question for the news anchors to use: How many targets will the Israelis attack at once? Will they go only for critical structures (with less psychological impact) or general obliteration?

3) The Iranians can’t stop the Israelis from penetrating their airspace and bombing at will.

Unless the Israelis make a major mistake, or the Iranians get very lucky, Israeli losses will be few to none.

The Israeli Air Force is a first-rate organization, with realistic training, top-of-the line equipment, and a leadership honed by years of conflict. Israeli electronic warfare skills include not only state-of-the-art conventional jamming, but “Suter” attacks: Essentially hacking into the enemy’s air defense network and messing with his mind. (“These are not the planes you’re looking for.”)

By contrast, the Iranian Air Defense Force (a separate military service in Iran), is equipped with a mix of ‘50s British, ‘60s U.S., and ‘90s Chinese radars (and the Chinese radars are really ‘70s technology). Their SAM inventory includes slightly upgraded copies of the old Russian SA-2 and SA-5, and the Hawk missile (which entered U.S. service in 1971) is still a major player. Their best fighters are two squadrons of early model MiG-29s, which are backed up by F-14s used as air-to-air fighter controllers. The AWG-9 on those 30+ year-old Tomcats is still the best air-to-air radar they’ve got. The rest of their air force is even less capable.

Question for news anchors to use: Given that GPS-guided ordnance can be lob-tossed from over ten miles away, why are the Iranians planting rings of antiaircraft guns around Natanz? Even their 100mm guns only have a range of about five miles.

4) The Iranians know they’re overmatched and they’re running scared.

Their constant threats to close the Strait of Hormuz remind me of an individual claiming they’ve got a gun that nobody ever sees. Closing the strait is a defensive move, designed to share their pain with as many others as possible. And it will hurt Iran as well as its enemies. The fact that it backfired in 1987 and yet they’re using the same threat again shows how desperate they are.

And by the way, the Iranians can’t use mines to close the strait. The water in the shipping channel is too deep, and the current too fast. Check the chart. It would take an advanced propelled-warhead mine, which the Iranians they haven’t been able to buy or produce on their own.

Iranian bluff and bluster falls into the same category. Notorious for staged demonstrations or outright fakery (remember the Photoshopped ballistic missile launch?), Iranian claims of new world-beating weapons need to be carefully examined before being repeated by the media.

Question for the news anchors to use: Looking at the history of Iranian press releases, what’s their accuracy quotient? What’s the best way to put their threats and boasts in context? How will we know when they’re really serious?

5) To get to Iran, the Israelis are going to have to overfly another Muslim country.

Referring to item number two above, this won’t be just a one-time occurrence. In addition to the strikers and a herd of diverse support aircraft, there will be tanker flights for in-flight refueling, post-strike reconnaissance sorties, combat SAR flights (precautionary, even if no planes are lost), and possibly damaged or malfunctioning aircraft diverting to airfields along the route.

In other words, the Israelis need to rent a corridor through another country’s airspace for several days, possibly as long as a week. Thanks to Wikileaks, we know the Saudis would love to help the Israelis out, but what would their imams say? The Iraqis have no love for their long-time Persian enemies, but what would the man in the street think about planes with the Star of David flying overhead? The Turks and Israelis were on relatively good terms until a few years ago, but it’s been downhill since then.
None of Iran’s neighbors want Tehran to have nukes, but the leaderships of all three countries would pay a heavy political price domestically if they countenanced the Israeli transit.

Question for the news anchors to use: What kind of a deal will Israel need to make to convince one of the three countries (Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia) to allow repeated overflights of their territory? It would have to be a secret deal, of course, until Israeli planes were in the air. A major concession on the Palestinian issue? How about Israel shutting down its own nuclear weapons program? Unless they’ve got compromising photos, the Israelis will have to pay something to somebody. Is such a deal already in place?

6) The Israeli F-15I and F-16I aircraft can make it to their targets with sufficient combat margin if they are allowed to refuel inflight before entering Iranian airspace.

See number five above. Israel has eight tankers based on Boeing 707 airframes, and by the way, they bought another one last year. IAI is converting it to a tanker configuration. That makes nine.

Question for the news anchors to use: No question. I’m just tired of reporters and pundits who can’t do the math.

7) Israel can’t convince the Iranian leadership to abandon its nuclear ambitions by bombing just Natanz; even bombing the entire nuclear weapons infrastructure may not work.

Bombing only Natanz will just piss the Iranians off, not that they need any incentive. Destroying the nuclear infrastructure only works if the Israelis can do it easily and without paying a heavy cost, militarily or politically. Demonstrating such complete superiority sends the message, “We will never let you finish. If you try to rebuild, we can come back any time we want.”
I call this the “Hiroshima effect.” Even faced with the horrific destruction of the first atomic bomb, the Japanese military leadership couldn’t really grasp the implications. It took a second weapon to make them understand that this wasn’t a fluke, that their enemy could now literally devastate Japan. Even then, there were hard cases who wanted to continue fighting. The Israelis face the same problem in getting the Iranian religious leaders to abandon their quest.

Iran really, really wants the bomb. It has paid a heavy price for its nuclear weapons program, in political and economic terms, and in talent and treasure. Cue the irony buzzer. If Iran had put the same effort into rebuilding and modernizing its oil industry (still recovering from the Iran-Iraq war), they’d have a world-class economy and a lot more (oil-based) friends in the world. Lucky for us they decided to build the bomb first.

Question for the news anchors to use: The Iranians are always trying to use their oil as a weapon. What if Israel ignored the nuclear sites and instead bombed oil refineries and loading terminals? How long would it take for the oil-poor Iranian economy to collapse? Would that make the Iranians yell “uncle?”

I don’t know how close the Iranians are to creating a nuclear weapon. It’s possible they don’t know themselves. Scientists have lied to dictators before. The Israelis are doing their damnedest to find out. So are we, although there are a lot of juicy questions there. Are we sharing what we know with the Israelis? How about the Israelis with us? Do we know what they consider a red flag?

The greatest danger is to consider the issue only in military terms. Like many modern conflicts, the results are likely to be one-sided, but unsatisfying.

Given that the real targets are the minds of the Iranian leaders, the outcome is less than certain. Also, given the heavy political cost Israel would have to pay, domestically and internationally, the Israelis will only go if they feel they are in imminent danger, and that no other course will remove the threat to their existence.

This is a big issue. Bad information could lead to a bad decision. We all need to study up.
Larry Bond is a New York Times best-selling author and wargame designer. Persian Incursion (with Chris Carlson and Jeff Dougherty), published in the summer of 2010 by Clash of Arms games, is a political-military board game that explores the consequences of an Israeli air campaign against Iran. Exit Plan (with Chris Carlson), to be published in May by Tor books, is the third book in the Jerry Mitchell series, and involves the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Tuesday, 3 April 2012

Israel's naval chief in trouble over April Fools' prank

Press Trust of India, Updated: April 02, 2012 22:53 IST


JerusalemIsrael's navy commander is in hot water over an April Fools' Day prank. Vice Admiral Ram Rothberg thought it would be funny to instruct his top commanders to prepare for a 10-day naval exercise in Italy and then pull the plug on April 1.


But the information leaked to lower officers, who worked over the weekend to prepare three ships to set sail. Some sailors' parents also rushed to the base to give their sons extra supplies and money.


The military command wasn't amused. It called the joke "inappropriate" and said that it was "investigating the incident in order to derive the proper lessons."


Rothberg became the navy chief last year, replacing Eliezer Marom, whose tenure was marked by scandal, after he was caught partying at a Tel Aviv strip club.

Friday, 30 March 2012

Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities

By DefenceTalk on Friday, March 30th, 2012


Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decision-makers now are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel’s history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria in 2007.

Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some viewing it as an existential threat.

This report analyzes key factors that may influence current Israeli political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.

For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have shared concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.

Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries?
  • Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way?
  • How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject?
  • How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options?

This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to various U.S. and Israeli officials.

Spending cuts take toll at European and Israeli defence firms


[first posted to http://jdw.janes.com - 22 March 2012]

The impact of government spending cuts across mature defence markets has been underlined by the lacklustre financial results of a series of major European and Israeli defence contractors, with warnings of "strong pressures" on military investment and "volatile macro-economic conditions". European groups EADS, Dassault, MBDA and Ruag have posted over the past week generally subdued financial results for 2011


Monday, 26 March 2012

Israeli Navy Acquires Its Sixth Submarine

By IsraeliMoD on Monday, March 26th, 2012


Israel and Germany signed a contract purchasing a submarine today, Wednesday (March 21). This will be the Israeli Navy's sixth submarine. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Defense Ministry CEO, Maj. Gen. (res.) Udi Shani and secretary of state of the German Federal Defense Ministry, Wolf Rudiger attended the signing ceremony the purchase.

Navy Commander, Maj. Gen. Ram Rothberg addressed the purchase of the new submarine while speaking at the naval officers' graduation ceremony. "Strategically, especially today, I am pleased with the approval and signing of a contract purchasing the Navy's sixth submarine, 54 years after submarines were first put into use in the Israeli Navy. The strength of IDF and the State of Israel, and its operational flexibility, will grow ten folds," said Maj. Gen. Rothberg.

Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, said today that "the sixth submarine multiplies the force and capability of the IDF and the State of Israel in the face of the growing challenges. The agreement indicates out cooperation with Germany and the German government's obligation to the security of Israel.

Barak stressed that "the Israeli Navy has been undergoing strategic changes over the past few years, placing it at the helm of Israel's security and the extent of the IDF's capabilities."

Friday, 23 March 2012

Rafael's Financial Results 2011


Rafael completes 2011 with a net profit of $111 million

21 March 2012 | Source: RAFAEL


Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. ended the year 2011 with a net profit of $111 million (397 million Shekels), with orders totaling $1.9 billion (7 billion Shekels), an order backlog of $3.5 billion (13,241 billion Shekels) and sales of $1.9 billion (7 billion Shekels).

Rafael announces today, March 21, 2012, its financial results for the year 2011:

Breakdown
2011 Results
2010 Results
Net Profits after taxes
$111M (397M Shekels)
$170M (633M Shekels)
Sales
$1,979M (7,080M Shekels)
$1,851M (6,911M Shekels)
Orders
$1,945M (6,960M Shekels)
$1,897M (7,081M Shekels)
Order Backlog
$3,465M (13,241M Shekels)
$3,568M (12,661M Shekels)



Rafael develops and manufactures advanced defense systems for the IDF and the defense establishment, such as the "Iron Dome" and "TROPHY" (an active defense system currently mounted on Merkava-4 MBT's), both of which became battle-proven in 2011, while continuing to expand its export activity to international markets.

The company offers its customers a diversified array of innovative solutions at the leading edge of global technology, from underwater systems through naval, ground, and air superiority systems to space systems.

Rafael is the largest employer in Northern Israel with approximately 6,500 employees and numerous subcontractor and service suppliers.

As noted, in 2011 Rafael posted a profit in the amount of $111 million (%5.6 of sales), compared to $170 million in 2010 (mainly from exceptional financing revenues, and the sale of its subsidiary Medingo, which significantly contributed to Rafael's profits).

Rafael's profits in 2011 were achieved for the most part from its production, R&D, and marketing in the following fields: air defense and superiority, defense systems for MBT's and armor vehicles, air-to-ground missiles, electro-optical-tactical precision missile systems, navigating, targeting and tactical reconnaissance pods, various types of armor and protection systems, remote-controlled weapon stations, breaching munitions, space propulsion, and more.

Rafael's sales of defense systems were notable in a number of areas, including air defense, air-to-surface, electro-optical-tactical precision missile systems, navigating, targeting and tactical reconnaissance pods, various types of armor and protection systems, remote-controlled weapon stations, breaching munitions, space propulsion, and more.

Rafael's order backlog in 2011 was $3,465 billion, comprising 1.8 years of sales activity, of which 70% is intended for export to many countries in Europe, Latin America, the U.S. and the Far East.

In addition, the year 2011 was characterized by Rafael’s continued investment in R&D (8% of its sales), in the professional development of its employees, the evaluation of new civilian investment opportunities such as renewable energy, complemented by its supportive role and significant contribution to academic institutions.

In the past year Rafael completed the acquisition of 50% of the shares of CONTROP, which develops and produces sophisticated electro-optical observation and security systems.

Rafael recently completed a capital-raising round after issuing 450 million shekels in bonds through expansion of its existing series to institutional clients, based on Rafael's AAA rating, according to Midroog, a credit rating company and subsidiary of Moody's.

VADM (Ret.) Yedidia Yaari, President and CEO of Rafael, said that 2011 was a successful year for Rafael, allowing it to continue to provide integrative solutions to Israel's security establishment and to its customers around the world – partly a result of Rafael's ground-breaking R&D programs and sound marketing activities.

Yaari stressed that the economic changes and uncertainties in Israel economy, coupled with concern about a slow-down in orders from Israel's MoD and from other countries around the world are responsible for the decrease in the company's order backlog. "These events will force us to take new measures that will allow us to maintain our business robustness on the one hand, and carry on with our marketing activities, especially overseas, on the other hand."

Yaari thanked Rafael's employees whose hard work and exceptional abilities allow Rafael to deliver the most advanced technologies to customers around the world and locally, technologies that are an integral part of Israel's defensive and battle-winning capabilities.

Major General (Ret.) Ilan Biran, Chairman of the Board at Rafael, said that Rafael continues to be a main pillar in Israel's security, by providing its defense establishment with unique capabilities such as Iron Dome and TROPHY, as well as an array of other products and technologies.

"Rafael's ability to balance between its mission as a national laboratory with international and its marketing activities is an essential component in our continued efforts to nurture our next generation of scientists and managers, alongside our development of cutting-edge technologies. It is this excellence that enables us to increase our financial resources from international activities and invest in the R&D of future systems that are part of the realization of Rafael's vision and the reinforcement of Israel's deterrence", said Biran.

Biran added that the global economic situation, which brought about a decrease in order backlog, combined with cuts in Israel's defense expenditure, have forced Rafael to take measures that will enable the company to grow and remain resilient, in light of the global slowdown and recession.
With the receipt of the 2011 financial results, the Chairman of the Board conveyed his thanks to the CEO and to the company’s management and employees for their invaluable contribution to Rafael’s international business foundation and to Israel’s security.