Instead of chasing such titles, let us work harder to improve the lives of
the poor
Power in inter-state relations is the capacity as well as the political
will to use that capacity, of one country to make another country do something
which, left to itself, it would not do or would not want to do. “Soft” power
should not be considered a component of the concept of power since it is not
relevant to modifying the behaviour of another country; it can and does serve
as a model and indirectly — and over a period of time — to earn goodwill among
sections of society of other countries for its culture.
But it has no place in the discussion of power as a means to bring about a
change in the attitude of another country. India
has a genuine attraction for many in the Middle East because of its pluralism
combined with a functioning democracy; however, it does not give any “power” to
India
to influence decision-making in those countries.
When we talk of power, we are thinking of military, economic and diplomatic
clout, not of Bollywood or yoga.
Spheres of influence
The 20th century offers many examples of the exercise of power by states
mostly in neighbouring countries or countries regarded as forming a part of
their spheres of influence.
There were at least 10 cases of American intervention, starting with Cuba when the Platt amendment was adopted in the
Senate which gave virtual control over Cuba
to the U.S. as well as
provided the framework for the lease of Guantánamo Bay .
Other examples are Panama
in 1903, Nicaragua in 1912, Haiti in 1915, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, Chile
in 1973, etc.
An example of the blatant exercise of power was the Anglo-French-Israeli
joint attack on the Suez Canal zone in 1956.
The Soviet Union used brute force to restore its domination of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. There was
of course the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 which had a lot
to do with the eventual collapse of the Soviet empire.
The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the evolution of
international law since then have completely changed the rules of the game of
the exercise of power by the introduction of the concept of legitimacy. It is
universally recognised that there are only two scenarios of the legitimate use
of force: pursuant to the Security Council authorisation or in the exercise of
the right of self-defence. The latter has been severely circumscribed by the
Charter which lays down that the right of self-defence can be exercised only in
response to an attack by another state, thus rejecting the “pre-emptive” right
of self-defence. The one case of unilateral use of force in the 21st century
was the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 which the
international community refused to recognise as legitimate since it did not have
the imprimatur of Security Council approval nor was it accepted as having been
in the exercise of the right of self-defence. United States/NATO intervention
in Afghanistan ,
on the other hand, was sanctioned by the U.N.
Of the three constituent elements of “power” — military, economic and
diplomatic — the economic is crucial. This is
self-evident and does not need elaboration.
One important reason why the Soviet Union
lost the Cold War was the mismatch between its bloated military and the
inability of its economy to support and sustain it.
Is there a “superpower” in the contemporary world? The answer is clearly in
the negative.
The Americans would rather prefer to
be recognised as the “exceptional” power.
The capacity of its military as well as the will of its political
leadership to deploy anywhere at any time without worrying about adverse
political or diplomatic reaction remains, but it is severely hobbled by its
increasing economic weakness.
To that extent, it is a global power. But it lacks in other attributes of
power. The most embarrassing moment for American diplomacy was in March 2003
when it failed to persuade enough members of the Security Council, including
some of its close allies, to support the “second resolution” on Iraq which would have legitimised its
intervention in Iraq ;
only four countries promised support. More and more members in the U.N. vote in
favour of the resolution criticising American sanctions against Cuba .
The U.S. has not had
much success in getting countries such as India
to fall in line with its Iran
policy. Getting its nominee elected president of the World Bank has less to do
with its diplomatic strength and more to do with the voting advantage that it
and its allies enjoy as also to the lack of unity among the challengers for the
job.
About China
If the U.S. and China can be
eliminated as candidates for “superpower” status, there is no need to consider
any other state for the position.
India 's case
Is India
at least a “regional” power? The most conspicuous example of the exercise of
power by India was the
operation in 1971 in former East Pakistan . India 's intervention was not authorised by the
U.N.; India justified it on
the ground of self-defence since Pakistan
had earlier attacked several Indian Air Force bases as also on the one that Pakistan had in fact invaded India in the
form of 10 million refugees. There is also the case of the intervention in the Seychelles in 1986, and one case of ill-advised
military intervention, in Sri Lanka
in the late 1980s which had disastrous consequences for India . There
was talk of India sending a
brigade to Iraq
in 2003, but wiser counsel prevailed. As a general rule, Indian participation
in military operations has been as a part of U.N.-mandated peace-keeping
operations, with the exceptions mentioned.
The global powers of yesteryear became such for concrete reasons: control
over sources of raw materials including oil and gas and protection of the
interests of their corporations, e.g. the case of the United Fruit Company in
Guatemala in the 1950s, an American company in which the then CIA director was
a shareholder.
Why do some analysts in India
feel enamoured of the prospect of India being called a global or a
regional power? Is it because of the sense of self-importance or prestige? Will
such a “title” give India
a place at the high table in international diplomacy? Others sometimes use this
adjective for us for one or both of these reasons: to flatter us — and we are
the most flattery-prone people in the world — and/or to make us take foreign
policy steps which would serve the objectives of those flattering us. Will the
label of regional power help ameliorate the lives of the poor in our country,
which is and should continue to be the guiding principle of our domestic as
well as external policy? Further, while we have soft power of doubtful
practical utility, we definitely are or have become or are becoming a super
“soft state.” India 's
neighbours have the full measure of its will, or lack thereof, to use whatever
hard power it has. One criterion of military power ought to be, not the
unlimited capacity to pay for imports of hardware, but how much of it is the
country able to manufacture domestically; India fares poorly in this respect.
The possession of nuclear weapons does not change anything. Pakistan too
has them. And, our nuclear weapons did not deter Pakistan
from indulging in the Kargil adventure, but Pakistan 's nuclear weapons
apparently deterred us from crossing the Line of Control (LoC) at that time,
and restrained us after 26/11. The boom years of India 's economy seem to be over at
least for the short term. Our forex reserves have ceased to grow and are likely
to dwindle, with the rising energy bill and diminished exports. A reduction in
interest rates might at some stage induce NRIs to start pulling out their
deposits as it happened in 1990-91. A declining economy makes for a poor case
for acceptance as a “power” of any kind.
In today's world, the concepts of super or global or even regional power do
not make sense. We should not waste our time or energy over this non-issue.
Fortunately, the Indian government does not seem to be much preoccupied about
such recognition.
(Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, former Indian Ambassador to the
United Nations, was until recently Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Special
Envoy for
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