A former
First Sea Lord laments the Royal Navy’s lack of ships – but what it needs most
is a maritime strategy.
By Chris Parry/ 8:40PM GMT 19 Mar 2012
By Chris Parry/ 8:40PM GMT 19 Mar 2012
Vigorous
debate about the role, size and shape of the Royal Navy is all the rage at the
moment. Numerous broadsides are being exchanged over whether the Navy is
equipped to defend the Falklands; the affordability and configuration of future
aircraft carriers; the appropriate numbers of destroyers and frigates; and the
introduction of new uniforms that wouldn’t look out of place in a fast food
outlet.
Lord West,
the former First Sea Lord and a Falklands veteran, suggests it is “bonkers”
that the Royal Navy has only 19 frigates and destroyers. But such is
the culture of intellectual and strategic relativism in which these arguments
take place that neither politicians nor the public have any idea whether 19 or
25 or 30 frigates and destroyers is the right number. All of these issues tinker
around the edges of the real problem – the fact that no one is prepared to
define what Britain wants the Royal Navy to do as part of a coherent maritime
strategy.
The essence
of military strategy lies in reconciling ends (what the public and politicians
want), means (what they can afford) and ways (the ability of the military to
deliver, in practical and technological terms). When these
elements are out of balance – or one or more of them is inadequate – then
defence programmes and spending tend to be incoherent and wasteful. On
operations, an imbalance leads to mission failure and in some cases can be
fatal, as was seen in Afghanistan, where it is doubtful whether at the start
there were adequate levels of political direction, resources or military
delivery.
The current size and structure
of the Royal Navy results from successive reductions in operational capability
and sustainability in response to annual demands for cuts in defence spending,
most recently and crucially in the fiscally driven Strategic Defence and
Security Review (SDSR). Recent minimalist operations in, over and off Libya
brought into sharp focus the serious incoherencies introduced by the SDSR and
by the high tempo of its implementation.
The whole process perpetuates
and reflects the dominant influence of accountancy management over the
application of rigorous strategic thinking, and a casual acceptance that
interventions are currently discretionary; in other words, we can choose
whether to involve ourselves or not.
In addition, future
requirements are too readily determined and defined by past conflicts. There is
a lazy acceptance of conventional wisdom, untouched by a rigorous assessment of
the future context within which forces are likely to operate and characterised
by the attitude that (in Professor Colin Gray’s words) “the future is like the
present, only more so”.
As a result, the Royal Navy
has accepted a deal that promises “jam tomorrow”, in the form of one or two
aircraft carriers (with or without catapult-launched fixed-wing aircraft) in or
around 2020, in return for increasing levels of pain and further cuts to other
naval forces until 2015 and beyond. Most significantly, the Royal Navy has now
– post-SDSR – demonstrably ceased to have a “balanced fleet”, the lodestone of
much of the post-Cold War era, and the basis even today for countering a range
of generic and emerging risks.
The Senior Service faces an
uncertain, unsettled decade, during which it might have to go in harm’s way
against state and non-state opponents with a gap in aircraft carrier and
fixed-wing aviation capability (after the Harriers were decommissioned), a
token anti-submarine force and widespread evidence of extensive hollowing-out
and overstretch in almost every other area of operation. Nor does it have the
resilience and endurance, as has been seen off Libya, to maintain even low
tempo operations for any length of time in addition to its routine directed
tasks.
This under-provision and
uncertainty will coincide with a decade of possible instability at sea. For
some 65 years, the security, integrity and freedom of use of the international
system – and the “super highway” or physical equivalent of the worldwide web
that is the sea – have been guaranteed and safeguarded by the United States and
the naval powers of the free world. It has long been recognised that peace and
order at sea does not keep itself.
In the rush
to downsize, it seems to have been forgotten that the sea remains the
pre-eminent strategic medium for economic growth, trade and human interaction,
a global “commons” that is increasingly becoming an arena for more intensive
activity, expressed as both cooperation and competition between states, and for
non-state actors, such as terrorists, pirates and traffickers.
It should be self-evident
that, in an interconnected world, any country that wants to stimulate and
sustain economic growth needs to invest in those instruments of power and
influence – space, cyberspace and the sea – that best exploit and extend the
benefits derived from globalisation, as well as ensuring access, supply of
resources and the free flow of goods.
To be fair, by 2020 a properly
resourced and supported force structure, front-loaded with carriers, amphibious
shipping, Astute class submarines and Type-45 destroyers, should be well placed
to conduct high-end conventional deterrence and war-fighting tasks, as well as
complementary roles in conducting operations at lower levels of intensity and
impact. But this aspiration will continue to be challenged as the costs of
providing leading-edge military capability rise and other political priorities
and domestic pressures compete for attention and resources in a time of
austerity. It will also be severely tested by the low numbers of destroyers and
frigates – a perennial complaint, all the way back to Nelson (“Were I to die
this moment, 'want of frigates’ would be found stamped on my heart”).
As the SDSR recognises, all
three Services will have to work hard to cooperate with allied or coalition
countries to ensure the continuation of comprehensive, all-arms capabilities.
In this context, the Royal Navy should in future probably seek to maintain a
force structure and capability that broadly maintains influence, utility and
congruence with the US for major operations, sustains a partnership role with
France (ready to lead or act as a framework nation) and retains the ability –
implying a balance and range of capabilities at sea – to act alone in support
of, and in defence of, vital national interests.
These considerations should
strongly influence the outcome of the next SDSR in 2015, at about the same time
as the next general election. The future will emphatically not be like
Afghanistan and Iraq; this should have significant implications for defence.
The Royal
Navy has not helped itself. It has been distinctly poor at arguing the case for
maritime power in the modern and emerging world over the past few years and in
justifying the resources it needs to remain a decisive instrument of state
power.
However, this debate should
not just be about the Royal Navy. It concerns fundamentally the United
Kingdom’s future in relation to the sea and should involve the comprehensive
integration of all those elements and partnerships – military, commercial and
institutional – that have an interest or contribution to make at sea. What is
required is a coherent national maritime strategy, in conjunction with a hard-driving
ministerial – or better still, an empowered, independent – champion, that can
overcome the chronic short-termism afflicting democratic decision-making and
can plan for the long term.
It should
identify the ends (political, diplomatic, economic and security benefits) that
the country seeks to achieve by its engagement with the sea, both in its
offshore economic zone and throughout the world. Only then
can the appropriate means (the investment that the country is prepared to make
in terms of resources, both human and financial) and the ways (the numbers and
types of warships, the size of the British merchant and fishing fleets, the
policy for energy security and a host of other mutually conflicting issues) be
properly reconciled and decided.
In 1436, one of the first
political poems in English, 'The Libel [or little book] of English Policy’
began by “exhortynge alle Englande to kepe the see enviroun”. That enduring
message remains a reasonable national strategy for today – and tomorrow.
Rear Admiral Chris Parry is the author of 'Down
South: A Falklands War Diary’ (Viking Penguin)
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