Friday 30 March 2012

The Future of Irregular Warfare 2


The RAND Corporation

The Future of Irregular Warfare 2
Before the Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
United States House of Representatives

March 27, 2012

Over the past decade, the United States has faced considerable irregular warfare challenges. Take Afghanistan. By early 2012, there were approximately 432,000 counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan – approximately 90,000 U.S. soldiers, 30,000 NATO soldiers, 300,000 Afghan National Security Forces, and 12,000 Afghan Local Police.3 In addition, the United States spent over $100 billion per year and deployed a range of sophisticated platforms and systems.

The Taliban, on the other hand, deployed between 20,000 and 40,000 forces (a ratio of nearly 11 to 1 in favor of counterinsurgents) and had revenues of $100-$200 million per year (a ratio of 500 to 1 in favor of counterinsurgents). In addition, Afghan insurgent groups focused on a range of asymmetric strategies and tactics, from tribal engagement to the use of improvised explosive devices and the Internet. Yet the Taliban’s ability to utilize limited resources and sustain a prolonged insurgency highlight some of America’s irregular warfare challenges.

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