By USGovernment on Friday, March 30th, 2012
The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval
modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The
question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering
improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.
Two DOD strategy and budget documents released in January 2012 state
that U.S. military strategy will place a renewed increased emphasis on the
Asia-Pacific region, and that as a result, there will be a renewed emphasis on
air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated that
notwithstanding reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S.
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained and
strengthened.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S.
Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities
could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese
military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some
observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such
a conflict could cause on both sides.
In the absence of such a conflict, however, the
U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence
day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on
whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense,
decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could
influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect
the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy
issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
China’s naval modernization effort, which began in
the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and
surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and
improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality,
education, training, and exercises.
Observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military
modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the
situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China
wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a
force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or
failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S.
naval and air forces.
Observers believe that China’s military
modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly
oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending
China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing
China’s view—a minority but growing view among world nations—that it has the
right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime
exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China’s sea lines of communications;
protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing
U.S. influence in the Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world
power.
Potential oversight issues for Congress include the
following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough to
adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also
adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around
the world; the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and
whether the Navy, in response to China’s maritime anti-access capabilities,
should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture.
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